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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Petition for modification of decree of divorce to increase
alimony and support payments, for delinquent support payments
under decree of divorce in the sum of $1,200.00, order to show
cause for contempt and attorney's fees.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Lower Court granted defendant's request for modification
of the decree of divorce and increased support to be paid by

plaintiff to defendant for the remaining minor child to $100. 00
per month, increased alimony to be paid by plaintiff to defendant
to$150.00 per month, denied defendant's claim for delinquent

support payments and awarded defendant attorney's fees of $200. 00
plus her costs.

The Lower Court specifically retained jurisdiction

of the matter to determine if support for the remaining minor child

should continue beyond his eighteenth birthday, after his graduation
from high school.

The contempt portion of the order to show cause

'ias di srni s s ed .

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Reversal of the Lower Court's order and judgment denying
Qefendant' s claim for delinquent support payments for Roger Allen
,\,ker Pursuant to decree of divorce for the period from May, 1975

:'' ti·,ro llctte of hearing of the order to show cause on June 14, 1977,
sun1 of $1,200.00.
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{2)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant-appellant, Elaine Wiker, was granted a decree of
divorce from the plaintiff-respondent, George Edward Wiker, on
January 29, 1965.

Mr. Wiker was ordered to pay support; Mrs.

Wiker was awarded the care, custody and control of Roger Allen,
then age 7, and Verlin Kay, then age 4.

{R. 21-23).

She was

awarded as support the sum of $50. 00 per month for each of said
minor children.

The original decree of divorce was amended and

modified by subsequent orders of the Court.
and R. 71-73).

{R.

31-32; R. 55-Sb;

Support for the two minor children, Roger Allena:.

Verlin Kay, was increased voluntarily in October of 1973, through
the efforts of Allen Hodgson, Family Court Administrator, to $75.'.:
per month per child, and support and alimony together totalled
$220.00 per month.

{R. 107-108, 109).

When the minor child,

Ro~'

Allen, turned age 18 on May 27, 1975, the plaintiff, Mr. Wiker,
stopped paying support for said child.

Defendant, Mrs. Wiker,

sought a judgment against plaintiff for the support payments
{R. 77-82).

by petition and order to show cause.

The Lower

Court denied the claim of defendant, Mrs. Wiker, for the delinquer:
support on the basis that the Legislature had changed the age of
majority for boys to 18 years of age subsequent to the decree of
divorce and that plaintiff, Mr. Wiker, did not have to pay suppor:
for the child in question after age 18.

(R.

105 I 110).

ARGUMENT
POINT

I

LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDl'.ilT
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(3)

DELINQUENT SUPPORT BY INCORRECT APPLICATION OF THE LAW.
The Lower Court, in denying defendant's claim for delinquent
support, concluded that the law amended by the Legislature in the
"ear 1975 relieved the plaintiff, Mr. Wiker, from payi.ng support
I

for the minor child, Roger Allen, after age 18, under the decree
of divorce of January 29, 1965.

At the time the decree of divorce

in this case was entered by the Court, Title 15-2-1 U.C.A. 1953,

before amendment, provided that
in males to 21 years of age".

11

the period of minority extends

The Utah Legislature, under pressure

of the united States Supreme Court's decision in Stanton v. Stanton,

1:.:

421 U.S. 7, 95

s.ct.

U.C.A. (L. Utah 1975)

1

1373, 43 L.Ed.2d 688, amended Title 15-2-1
to read:

"The period of minority extends in males and females to
the age of eighteen years; * * * *."
The Lower Court applied the above cited Statute as amended to
the decree of divorce in this case retroactively.

The Lower Court

concluded that the Legislature in so amending 15-2-1 U.C.A., changed
or modified the decree of divorce.

The con cl us ion of the Lower

Court is clearly contrary to and in conflict with the rulings of
this Court in the Stanton cases. In Stanton v. Stanton, 517 P.2d
1010, this Court stated at page 1013:

"The general rule is that the decree fixes the obligations
of the parties; and they cannot modify it or change their
obligations by their conduct. * * * *."
II

I

I

n the absence of any modification of the decree, the support
money accrued in accordance with its terms; and it was not the
prerogative of the defendant to unilaterally decide that he
would not pay support money * * *. 11
Wiker, the plaintiff in this case, discontinued paying
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(4)
support for Roger Allen when he turned 18 years of age, May
197 5.

27 I

There was no modifica tiori of the decree of divorce Which

was entered when the law provided that support would be paid for
males to age 21.

In the later Stanton case, 552 P.2d 112, the

age of the male child was never called into question.

This Cour

said at page 114:

"The question before us is the interpretation to be g09
to the decree of divorce from which no appeal has ever
been taken by either party.
That decree is final and
cannot now be changed. At the time the decree was made,
everybody knew that for almost one hundred years the age of
majority for girls was and had been 18. The Judge and thE
the parties to this proceeding all assumed that when the
decree stated that the father should be the one to furnish
the support for the children during their minority it
meant that the father should furnish the support forthe
son until he reached age 21 * * *
No honest interpretati1
of that decree can be made to the contrary."
(Emphasis
Added).
Chief Justice Henriod, in his concurring opinion, stated at
pages 114 and 115:
"Because this Court upheld an award for support of a
female child until she became 18, but not thereafter,
certainly is no matter of res judicata as to the fact,
therefore, that a male (who is not particeps here),
is entitled to support, in a divorce, only until he
11
iS 18 I * * *
"At the time of the entry of the decree,
Section 15-2-1 U.C.A. 1953, provided:

* * *,

our Statute

The period of minority extends in males to age of
twenty one years and in females to that of eighteen
years."
"Itcould not be plainer that under both the statutor~he
decisional law of this State as it existed at the.~
decree was entered, and therefore as was necessari Y rt
the contemplation of the parties, and of the trial cou '
the only obligation it imposed upon the defendant~.
that he pay the $100 per month until his daughter ~9.
was 18."
(Emphasis Added).
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(5)
Applying the same rational to this case, it is clear that
the decree of divorce, under both the statutory and decisional
law existing at the time the decree was entered, imposed upon

plaintiff that he pay support for his son until age 21 at the rate
of $75. oo per month.
Justice Maughan, in his dissenting opinion, advanced an
additional theory in support of the position of defendant, Mrs.
\liker.

He stated at page 117:

"Under one theory, if the statute be deemed void,
cor.unon law "shall be the rule of decision in all
of this State".
( 68-3-1)
Under the common law,
male and female attain their majority at the age
years."

the
Courts
both
of 21

Applying this theory to the instant case, the plaintiff,
Mr.

Wiker, was obligated to pay support for Roger Allen until

age 21, as well as by order of the Court under the decree of divorce.
Article I, Section 18, Utah Constitution prohibits the passing
of ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts.
If this in fact be the law in the State of Utah, the amending of

Title 15-2-1 by the Legislature should have had no retroactive

effect on the decree of divorce in this case entered prior to
such amendment.

The law in force and effect at the time of the

~~~ provided that support should be paid for males until age
2
1. Until the decree of divorce was modified as to the age when
support would terminate, Mr. Wiker was obligated to pay support for
Roger Allen until age 21.
to a

The defendant, Mrs. Wiker, was entitled

judgment for all delinquent support payments admittedly not

b~ Plaintiff under the decree.

The retroactive application of
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(6)
Title 15-2-1 after amendment by the Lower Court was error,
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, defendant, Mrs. Wiker, submits that the
Lower Court committed error in denying her claim for delinquent
support of $75.00 per month for the minor son, Rober Allen
Wiker, under the decree of divorce of January 29, 1965, as modi·
fied, for the period of May 27, 1975 to the date of hearing in
the total sum of $1,200.00, plus interest.
Respectfully Submitted,

E.
COTROES,
& BEASLEY
430 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
Served two (2) copies of the
foregoing Brief Of Appellant
on Respondent by delivering
the same to James A. Mcintosh
of James A. Mcintosh & Associates,
525 South 300 East, Salt Lake
City, Utah, on this /2;' day of

Ja~~
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